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Herder’s Sculptural Thinking 
Rowan Bailey 
 
If it was a philosopher who named our century the age of philosophy, perhaps he understood 
thereby the century of cold Schwärmerei and Schwärmender coldness. […] The Schwärmer 
wants to be the greatest philosopher, and the greatest philosopher is the greatest Schwärmer 
[…] Schwärmerei in abstractions of the head fights the abstractions of sensibility 
(Empfindung). A human being who wants to be only head is a monster, as is one who wants to 
be only heart.1 
 
The language of philosophy, in its written form, can appear cold and abstract to the untrained reader. 
For Herder, the manifestations of thinking activity should, as a shared common sense, be accessible to 
everyone. The 'healthy understanding' of a sense-in-common has the potential to serve all humanity. In 
his 1776 essay 'Philosophei und Schwärmerei', Herder discusses how thought and sensation, the head 
and the heart, are codependent. As soon as one thinks, one participates in the practical activity of 
making 'abstractions of sensibility'. Enthusiasm gives philosophical thinking, its compulsion to produce 
concepts. But, whereas warm enthusiasm engages with matter, whereby the sensory qualities of 
formation (Bildung) - colour, sounds, smells, shape, sensations of heat and cold - give material 
properties to the things we name, cold enthusiasm (Schwärmerei) manifests itself in an unthinking 
attitude or behaviour, detached from the heart. We must work hard to maintain a healthy balance 
between warm and cold enthusiasms. As a form of philosophical practice, thinking is a 'whole way of 
life'2 but a 'difficult art of living'.3  
 
Sculptural formations are never far from Herder's philosophy of thinking communities. With his call 
for a practical doctrine of reason in the pages of Plastik, existing cultural forms are reworked by the 
mediating activity of bodily thinking.4 What we receive we also reinterpret; there is no distinction 
between what we do and how we think. A physical and material engagement with the world 
encapsulates his ideal of the beautiful:  
The well-proportioned human being is not an abstraction derived from the clouds or composed 
from learned rules or arbitrary conventions. It is something that can be grasped and felt by all 
who are able to recognize in themselves or in others the form of life (Form des Lebens), the 
expression of force (Ausdruck der Kraft) in the human vessel. Beauty is nothing but the 
meaning of inner perfection.5 
 
Does this not make enthusiasm an indeterminate and complex cultural phenomenon? Touching the heat 
and cold of matter is Herder's approach to the feeling of form. We warm up cold materials but also 
encounter the dead lifeless matter of stone. These primal experiences are emotive. The stimulation or 
irritation (Reiz) of matter is both pleasurable and painful. If language has the power to transmit 
feelings, and culture is made with the expressive formations of these experiential encounters, then 
'characteristic marks' of the sculptural are not simply inherited descriptors or classificatory signifiers 
for certain objects; they are the material effects of ongoing thinking activity:  
The human being demonstrates reflection when the force of his soul operates so freely that in 
the whole ocean of sensations (Ozean von Empfindungen) which floods the soul through all 
the senses it can, so to speak, separate off, stop, and pay attention to a single wave (eine 
Welle), and be conscious of its own attentiveness. The human being demonstrates reflection 
when, out of the whole hovering dream of images which proceed before the senses, he can 
collect himself into a moment of alertness, freely dwell on a single image, pay it clear, more 
leisurely heed, and separate off characteristic marks for the fact that it is that object and no 
other. Thus he demonstrates reflection when he can not only recognize all the properties in a 
vivid and clear way, but can in his own mind acknowledge one or several as distinguishing 
properties.6 
 
The act of distinguishing, of undertaking the activity of reflection, of separating off features or 
properties of the sculptural has to be a harmonious balance between the head and the heart. To take 
note of all the single waves within a 'whole ocean of sensations' is as a lived experience, part of the 
process of reflection or 'taking awareness' (Besinnung). Language, human thought and culture is a 
collective process of communication. Herder's use of Besinnung as a form of thinking dependent on the 
senses expands the more restrictive concept of Reflexion. The organic development of historical 
change from the ground of lived exchanges with others, embodies a philosophical practice of the 
senses. The 'whole ocean of sensations' is the sensuous commune of the world. When cries are 
instituted into language, the line of beauty calls forth the muted. In an age of cold Schwärmerei, 
thinking runs the risk of losing touch with sensibility, and with it, a warm enthusiasm derived from our 
sensorial encounters with matter. So, how does Herder propose to shape a sculptural language for 
philosophy and with what effects?  
 
Communities of sense 
   
Whereas Kant's structuring of the synthetic a priori shapes a conception of sensus communis 
(Gemeinsinn)7, Herder prefers to consider the human being as a 'single thinking sensorium commune' 
(ein denkendes sensorium commune).8 by which he means that language, and with it a capacity to 
reason, is derived from the interconnected relation between all the senses. Feeling (Gefühl) is the 
connective that links sensations together in a chain. Through learning, we come to disassociate the 
senses; we partition them through our thinking activity and develop a language of 'names' for 
differentiating our experiences. To become more aware of the 'sensuous sensations in us' (sinnliche 
Empfindungen in uns)9 can guide us towards feeling the 'thinking sensorium commune' of our being. 
The self must never stand abstracted, unreflective and dissociated from others. 
 
In 'On the Cognition and Sensation of the Human Soul', first published in 1778,10 Herder reinforces 
the argument laid out in his earlier 1772 text 'Treatise on the Origin of Language'. Thinking, in the 
form of reason, is a total disposition within all human beings, and language is the medium through 
which thought and the senses are shaped. Language informs thoughts. Thoughts inform language. We 
use words to solidify our sensations. We become conscious or aware of ourselves by thinking with and 
through distinguishing marks. The act of 'taking awareness' (Besinnung) is a mode of making that uses 
language as a tool for the creative processes of thinking; the expressive and emotional character of 
words stands opposed to the view that distinguishing marks are mere supplements or replacements for 
pre-existing sensations. As an empiricist, Herder does not think that language is borne out of abstract 
philosophizing. Rather, concepts are the outcome of the productive activity of translating our 
perceptual and affective sensations. Feeling is a mode of interpretative activity, which imaginatively 
shapes sensations into the material imagery of concepts. We not only inherit the tools of language, we 
also use them, and through usage, participate in the productive activities of shaping and making the 
language that we use. 'Abstractions of the head' and 'abstractions of sensibility' are modes of making 
with the tools of language. 
 
In The Long Revolution, first published in 1961, Raymond Williams defines the 'structure of feeling' as 
the 'culture of the period: it is the particular living results of all the elements in the general 
organization'.11 More importantly, the 'structure of feeling' is not a universally imposed structure, but 
experienced uniquely. 'I do not mean' writes Williams, 'that the structure of feeling, anymore than 
social character, is possessed in the same way by the many individuals in the community. But I think it 
is a very deep and very wide possession, in all actual communities, precisely because it is on it that 
communication depends'.12 Communication is an expressive tool for sharing the lived experiences of 
material culture. The 'structure of feeling' is a particular and unique way of feeding language with the 
material and social practices of cultural life. Cultural formations undergo transformation through 
language practice. For Williams then, historical change informs the shifting nature of language and its 
usage by a given community. Each specific culture is self-contained and develops on its own terms, but 
from the ground of the communally shared self-expression of the group as a whole. The interdependent 
relation of part to whole is at the heart of a consideration of the ways in which we give form and shape 
to our experiences and how existing material forms and shapes in the world, informs what we inherit 
and how we interpret these inheritances. Thoughts are part of the chain of interrelations between human 
beings past, present and future. Thinking and inheritance are interrelated. Tracking shifts in the 
meaning and use of language appeals to the 'structure of feeling' as a mode of knowing distinct from 
'social character' or 'pattern of culture'. 
 
Williams discusses Herder in depth in his 1976 dictionary Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and 
Society.13 Within the entry 'Culture' and following an account of the emergence of the meaning of 
culture as 'cultivation' and 'civilization' brought about by the European Enlightenment, he introduces 
Herder as a little-known eighteenth century philosopher who has nevertheless contributed to a radical 
shift in thinking about Cultur, with an attack on the 'civilising' tendencies of State control. For Herder, 
Enlightenment philosophy's attempts to abstract the world adheres to a rigid method of system 
building; a deferment from the realm of particulars and the material stuff of life. He stood against the 
rift of mind from body famously articulated by Descartes' cogito, preferring instead to argue that 
material relations of the world serve as the foundation for thinking. 'Taking-awareness' (Besinnung), is 
made possible through sensory bodily experience and stands opposed to the abstract forces of 
metaphysical logic. Herder's attempts to get inside 'feeling' and to experience the past more intimately, 
shapes his idea of culture and this directs his consideration of history as a process of organic cultural 
development, rather than as a fixed and static structure with determined ends. Thinking is cultivated, 
shaped, and informed by customs and rituals, as well as providing new ways of interpreting and making 
cultural life. Sculptural thinking, as a mode of making, is at the core of both Williams' and Herder's 
readings of culture as a communally 'lived experience'. 
 
 
Lexemes of the sculptural - Abstractions of sensibility 
   
Will a practical doctrine of reason ever be written, a philosophical lexicon of language, the 
senses, and the fine arts that traces each word and each concept back to its origin and uncovers 
the processes whereby a word or concept is carried over from one sense to another, and from 
the senses to the mind? Without inquiries of this sort to serve as a guide, everything will 
remain as it currently is, a labyrinth and chatter of reason.14 
 
Herder's consideration of the diversity of cultural specificities that constitute world history informs his 
aesthetic ideal of the art of sculpture. Plastik is an ambitious project. Published in 1778, the same year 
as 'In Cognition and Sensation in the Human Soul', it is a text that offers philosophical practice up as a 
branch of thinking with and through the cultural and historical transmutations of form. The drive or 
impulse to shift, adapt, and alter the languages of inheritance is underpinned by the development of 
sculptural lexemes in Herder's writing and evidences a distinctly different way of thinking from that of 
his contemporaries.15 A community of the senses that lends itself to a language of the sculptural 
requires the reflective activity of the senses. Herder's call for 'a philosophical lexicon of language, the 
senses, and the fine arts',16 is a call to make 'abstractions of sensibility' out of the body's reception, 
digestion and response to the world. It is the thinking body, enthused by sentiment that allows the 
'healthy understanding' of the soul to receive feeling and produce a different kind of language. 
Approaching language as a tool for creative production, transforms how we come to think, feel and 
articulate with the body. This hermeneutical engagement with sculpture provides some insights into the 
practical lexicography of the sculptural. The rhetoric of enthusiasm illustrates those 'abstractions of 
sensibility' derived from a human striving to achieve a harmonious balance between sensation and 
intellect. The precariousness of this balance is also Herder's rigorous engagement with sensus 
communis.  
 
Begreifen 
   
The inventory of sculptural lexemes within Herder's writing are primarily oriented around sensory 
touch encounters with shape, size, volume and material substances. Feeling is a capacity to reflect upon 
experience to make sense of it. The register of words as signs for things involves the activity of naming 
things into the space of the world, which in turn communicate back to the senses. Whereas sight-based 
encounters supplement the three-dimensionality of sculpture with surface impressions, touch helps 
philosophy to think 'solidly'. It is the touch encounter with works of sculpture that enable concepts of 
three-dimensionality, form, mass and volume, to take shape in the mind. How we take hold of objects 
and make sense of them begins in childhood with a desire to grasp and handle material things. 
 
Early on in Plastik touch is positioned as the foundation for the development of tactile concepts. What 
we learn through touch can inform how we see with the eye. We need to touch the properties of bodies 
to become bodies that think:  
For what are properties of bodies if not relations to our own body, to our sense of touch? The 
light that strikes my eye can no more give me access to concepts such as solidity, hardness, 
softness, smoothness, form, shape, or volume than my mind can generate embodied, living 
concepts by independent thinking. […] Only human beings have them, because alongside 
reason we possess a hand that can feel and grasp.17 
 
Contained in the word Begriff, the German word for concept, is the activity of touching. Begriff is 
linked to the verbs Begreifen, 'to understand', Greifen, 'to take hold of something', and Griff, 'the grip or 
grasp'. The interrelation between 'taking hold' and the manifestation of a thought or idea conveys how 
expression is a way to communicate thoughts and feelings in and through the material gestures of the 
body.18 The etymology of 'expression' evokes a physical contact with the body in an attempt to 
impress a meaningful content onto bodily gestures. 'Expression' both presses out a gestural language 
from the body as well as imprinting around the body the line of language.19 Herder's use of the word 
expression (Ausdruck) appeals to the communicability of the body itself: 'Beauty, then, is always only 
the shining through of form, the sensible expression of perfection (Sinnlicher Ausdruck der 
Vollkommenheit) in relation to an end, the surge of life, human health'.20 The power of touch to 
generate concepts of solidity reveals the experiential dimension that informs and shapes the sculptural 
lexemes of Herder's philosophy.  
 
The line of touch that weaves its way around the body establishes connections between body parts. 
Using our imagination, at a distance, we trace with our fingertips an uninterrupted line around a 
material formation. Forming and feeling is an interconnected activity. The line of beauty as a seamless 
and continuous flow between parts appears on the surface of three-dimensional forms, and as a way of 
thinking, it helps us to grasp the concept of a thing, its material life and diverse particularity. Feeling 
and forming, appeals to the word Begreifen as an expression of the ideal of unity in diversity:  
If we did not have this [a capacity to reason and a capacity to touch with our bodies], if we had 
no means by which we could confirm the existence of a body for ourselves through our own 
bodily feeling, we could only infer and guess and dream and fabricate, and we would know 
nothing for certain. The more we are able to take hold of a body as a body, rather than staring 
at it and dreaming of it, the more vital is our feeling for the object, or, as it is expressed in the 
word itself, our concept of the thing.21 
 
To grasp the concept of a thing is to encounter a fundamental feeling for the life of an object and this 
register affirms the existence of a body through our own bodily feeling, or responses to other bodies. 
'Taking hold' can produce an uplifting enthusiasm for the properties of a thing. Moreover, the sensory 
ground from which these concepts of materiality develop, allows them to take on a life force of their 
own. Solid concepts derived from touch encounters with material properties - tactile properties (rough, 
smooth, hot, cold), haptic properties (solids, three-dimensional shapes, and our grasping of them) and 
kineaesthetic perceptions (the orientation of our bodies in space and our engagement with spatial 
objects) - are in Herder's sense of the word, concepts of things. Because we are capable of touching, of 
engaging in touching activity, we are also capable of participating in a touching community.  
 
Einfühlung 
   
This ideal of community brings Einfühlung into contact with the structuring of analogy. The 
imaginative power of touch activates different forms of life expressed through the human body and is 
experienced as a flow of energies. For example, Einfühlung, the German word for 'empathy', literally 
translates as 'feeling one's way inside' and underpins Herder's unique approach to empiricism. 'Feeling 
one's way inside' is a hermeneutic mode of interpretative activity. A text's use of language, including 
the researcher's own interpretative thinking about texts is inseparable from the materiality of the 
imaginative touch encounter. This kind of thinking pushes the analogical drive to treat the eye as if it 
were a hand:  
Consider the lover of art sunk deep in contemplation who circles restlessly around a sculpture. 
What would he not do to transform his sight into touch, to make his seeing into a form of 
touching that feels in the dark? […] he shifts from place to place: his eye becomes his hand 
and the ray of light his finger, or rather, his soul has a finger that is yet finer than his hand or 
the ray of light.22 
 
The aesthetic encounter that gives place to the analogical process of Einfühlung requires the sculptural 
register of material. Touch encounters with sculpture enables the concept of 'feeling inside' to be 
activated in the mind, but this is only possible from the ground of thinking analogically. Herder uses 
the structure of as if to situate oneself inside the space of the 'other', whether that is the mind of another 
person or a material formation. Einfühlung thus carries an energy and motivation for dialogical 
exchange. Adopting modes of making in the very writing of philosophy marks a shift in thinking about 
sculpture as a mere object and towards engagements with processes of sculptural production. This shift 
in register helps us to recognize not only how we are constituted and shaped but also how we in turn 
constitute, shape and form the world in response. For us to feel empathically, we must participate in the 
activities of thinking analogically, of considering the imagination as if it were a touching faculty, 
training the mind to see as if it were touching materials. Empathic understanding is a form of sharing 
that plays an important role in the process of concretizing concepts. Solid concepts are bound to the 
objects of material culture; the production of concepts out of material encounters is a way of entering 
into modes of experience. Einfühlung is not simply restricted to the individual aesthetic encounter we 
have with works of sculpture. It should be a whole way of life, a driving force within a community.  
 
It is with Herder's consideration of sculpture as a tool to assist in the formation and development of an 
ideal, that Johann Joachim Winckelmann's comments on expression and the ideal of beauty in the 
History of Ancient Art (1764) carry weight. Winckelmann sets out to question the abstract 
philosophising of beauty on the grounds that it neglects and marginalises the subject matter of artistic 
production. The ideal of the beautiful is a unification of particulars; a creative production in the mind of 
a whole, not to be found in nature. Winckelmann writes:  
By the Ideal is to be understood merely the highest possible beauty of the whole figure, which 
can hardly exist in nature in the same high degree in which it appears in some statues.23 
 
Greek artists for example generate ideal images that bring together forms with a 'nobler progeny, not of 
this world'.24 The beautiful is thus bound to the ideal produced by the human mind from out of the 
assimilation and synthesis of particulars. Winckelmann's approach to beauty through the model of 
classical antiquity, like Herder's, seeks to engage with the expression of the beautiful in actual 
artistic/cultural productions. Expression brings together mind and body, comprehends action in and 
through the features of the body. This shows how far an idea of beauty can never have a clear identity 
as such. It is rather that abstract conceptions of beauty now represented in bodily shape comment on the 
ways in which human life cannot be objectified as an abstraction of the head and must be played out 
through expressive actions. In this respect, the ideal is determinate, that is, it has a specific relationship 
to the realm of particulars.  
 Herder's attempts to bridge the gap between art and life promotes aesthetics as the key to the 
development of a theory of knowledge grounded in the psychological-physiological forces of human 
experience. Formation (Bildung) as an activity of making conveys the theme of expression, to the 
representation, mediation and transformation involved in the process of giving 'shape' to feeling. The 
interconnected relationship between impression and expression is a life-giving activity; a way of 
breathing in and expelling out the sentiments of our encounters with the world. Statues, in particular, 
serve as a primary tool for thinking sculpturally and aids in the development of a deeper understanding 
of a world received through the senses. As representations of the human form, they serve as examples 
of thinking about the body as an aggregate of interconnected expressive and readable features: 'Imagine 
a sculpture of a philosopher with a brow that does not think; a Hercules without strength between his 
eyebrows, or in his neck or chest, or in his body as a whole'.25 How do the expressive features of the 
body lend themselves to the sentiments of human countenance? With a language that can aid the 
development of a healthy understanding, sculpture serves as the tool through which a different kind of 
thinking of humanity may be shaped:  
The more a part of the body signifies what it should signify, the more beautiful it is, inner 
sympathy alone, feeling and the transposition of our entire human self into the figure we 
touch, is the true teacher and instrument of beauty.26 
 
Lexemes of the sculptural are thus aesthetic readings of sentiment, rather than the outcome of a 
philosophical drive to take hold of sculpture and make it serve the structural system of the fine arts it 
inherits and to some extent continues to reproduce. The language of the sculptural, its conceptual 
themes and processes, is a departure from the confines of a classificatory system for naming the arts. 
Sculptural thinking is an 'indisciplinary' encounter that reshapes experience by opening up new spaces 
for exchange.27  
 
Bildung 
   
Bildung (self-formation/self-cultivation/self-moulding) is an important figuration in Herder's 
philosophical lexicon of the sculptural. Formations of the self are shaped by expressive activity, such as 
the making of sculpture or the writing of the sculptural. Herder's social ideal, Sensus Humanitätis 
directs this approach to Bildung. Sensus Humanitätis is an inborn disposition to want to organise 
ourselves for freedom. It is an active process not a simple 'love of humankind' (humanity, 
Menschlichkeit), and is only ever encountered through tangible expressions; this disposition is always 
subject to translation. Expressions are responses to the social environment within which we find 
ourselves. Our consciousness is informed and shaped by how, what, and who, we are responding to, 
and with. Thinking is a process of interaction and formation. Sensus Humanitätis triggers how we think 
and respond to the spaces we inhabit. Each community has its own image of Humanität that develops 
and takes shape in accordance with prevailing conditions (historical and geographical). Herder stands 
opposed to the idea of a universal language, but understands that each community has the 'right to form 
themselves to that type of Humanität which they envisaged'.28 Self-determination will always assume 
different forms of creative expression in different contexts. Each community interprets this social ideal 
in its own specific way. Although humankind's orientation for freedom is a universal disposition in 
everyone, regardless of differences of class, nationality, race, gender or sexuality its interpretation and 
application is subject to time and place. Context is mass and variety. Sensus Humanitätis is always 
disseminated and translated by the material manifestations of our expressive activity. 
 
In his 1765 essay 'How Philosophy Can Become More Universal and Useful for the Benefit of the 
People',29 Herder accuses abstract philosophy of failing to be part of the life of a community. He 
proposes that we work to produce another kind of philosophy, an ideal kind, which when removed from 
the metaphysical underpinnings in logic and moral theory can show itself in and through the expressive 
languages of different cultures. When philosophy abstracts the world and allows its abstractions to 
'remain unattacked, unmutilated', it renders itself useless for the people. 'The people' are 'citizens of the 
state' and not trained philosophers.30 Volk, Herder's concept for the ever-changing character of a 
community, relies on the interrelationships between members. Interrelationships shape and reshape 
communities over time. Social collectives (Völker) are geographically determined. 'Das Volk' is a 
pluralistic concept, which conveys the existence of a multitude of individuated groups of people, 
marked out by languages, ethnicities, climates, geographies, and cultures. These differences call for 
'transnational empathy'31 whereby each country should feel the pain of another country disturbed or 
troubled by unethical actions. 
 
In this respect, philosophy must be reformed and made applicable and accessible within cultural life. 
Herder writes:  
I must talk to the people in its language, in its manner of thought, in its sphere. Its language is 
things and not words; its manner of thought lively, not clear - certain, not proving; its sphere 
real advantage in daily affairs, foundations for advantage, or lively pleasure. Behold!, that is 
what philosophy must do in order to be a philosophy of the common people. Who recognizes 
our philosophy in this picture?32 
 
The experiential dimension to this account of philosophy brings the function and purpose of education 
into direct contact with the multitude. The art of sculpture is one kind of response to this social ideal. 
Rather than study the human from the abstract principles of philosophy, Herder uses the verb Bilden 
through the sculptural ('to form' or 'to mould') and applies this to the practices of educating. The essay 
is structured along the lines of a series of different philosophical formations (Bildung) within the areas 
of logic, morality and politics. Bildung is thus a tool of self-development that stays faithful to the 
etymological ground of the word as a tool of formation. The shift from the abstract theorizing of 
enlightenment philosophy to a practical, anthropologically oriented and popular philosophy is a key 
feature of Herder's approach to what philosophy could be. This ideal philosophy is a philosophy of 
sculptural practice. This is why Herder is so keen to promote a philosophy shaped out of the stuff of 
life. The inward and outward expressions of people as both embodiments and bearers of culture, 
underpins any writing of history.  
 
Forming the university 
   
The nineteenth century reception of Herder's practical philosophy is a distinct pedagogical remodelling 
of Bildung; a reformation of knowledge within the context of the University. The popularity of the 
concept Bildung (as 'self-cultivation' or 'self-formation') appears also within the educational reforms of 
the University of Berlin, which Wilhelm von Humboldt helped to administer. Founded in 1810, the 
University of Berlin was to be an exemplary model for teaching and research in Prussia. The 
educational reforms that Humboldt as Director for the Department of Public Education from 1809-1810 
promoted, allowed the study of ancient Greek culture to play a crucial role in a new program of 
scholarship. By generating an idea of antiquity, as moral high ground for the 'self-cultivation' or 'self-
formation' of the individual, Humboldt makes Bildung a practical touchstone for philosophical 
thinking.33 
 
The architectural structure of the University of Berlin was originally a palace, close to the State Opera 
House at the east end of Unter den Linden. In 1809, the Prussian King Friedrich Wilhelm II transferred 
ownership of the palace to the University. The State Opera House, designed by the architect Georg 
Wenzeslaus Von Knobelsdorff, could be viewed from the lecture halls, along with the hustle and bustle 
of city life. Heinrich Heine's description of the University in his letters from Berlin, dated 1822, 
captures both the sense of disappointment with the interior teaching spaces, particularly with regard to 
the cramped conditions and distracting views from the windows. The interiority of the University paled 
in comparison with the awe-inspiring architectural façade of the palace and the crowds negotiating the 
spaces of the city. Heine writes:  
 
How does the University please you? A truly magnificent edifice! It is a pity that so few of the 
lecture-rooms are spacious. For the most part they are gloomy and comfortless; and, what is 
worse, in many of them the windows front the street, and afford, at an oblique angle, a view of 
the Opera House. How the luckless students must sit upon hot coals when the leathern wit - 
indeed not even Morocco leather but pig's leather wit - of a dry-as-dust professor drones in his 
ears, while his eyes stray towards the street, fascinated by the picturesque spectacle of the 
brilliant equipages, the marching soldiers, the nymphs who skip past, and the gay crowd 
which streams towards the Opera House.34 
 
The structural organisation inside the University centred on four faculties: Law, Medicine, Philosophy, 
and Theology. Both Fichte, who was the first Vice-Chancellor at the University, and Schleiermacher, 
contributed to the ideas behind Humboldt's system, and the study of classical antiquity became tied to 
the reforming process associated with the name Bildung. Within the establishment of higher learning, 
the production of the self was considered to be shaped by rigorous thinking.  
 
Humboldt's The Limits of State Action (also translated as The Sphere and Duties of Government) 
written in 1791-2 and not published as a full manuscript until seventeen years after his death in 1835, is 
an examination of Enlightenment ideals and their re-expression through educational reform. For 
Humboldt, the cultivation of the individual freed from the fetters of State control would radically alter 
relations of citizen to State. 'State interference' he suggests, hinders the development of individuality 
and the role of education should provide the individual with the skills and initiative to interact with the 
State rather than remain pacified by its authority.35 Bildung, when put into practice, offers an 
alternative to the image of State control, dwelling instead on the individual's relation to the 
environments they inhabit and the cultures they create. Education and the individual are seen as co-
dependent. The individual must believe that the structure of education provides a place for the 
development of their autonomy and in turn, education requires the autonomous thinking of the 
individual to realise the ideal of Bildung. For Humboldt, education needs 'free activity on the part of the 
individual'36 in order to fulfil its objective; to 'develop the individual'.37 Furthermore, with such 
training an active engagement between citizen and State is formed, creating conditions for social 
change. Such change occurs when 'the citizen becomes spontaneously active in the State itself',38 that 
is, when a conflict or contradiction arises 'between the position pointed out to him by the State, and that 
which he has spontaneously chosen, he is in part himself changed, and the State constitution also 
experiences some modification'.39 
 
Humboldt's account of the self-governing person appeals to the famous motto in Kant's 1784 essay 
'Answering the Question: What is Enlightenment?' 'Sapere Aude!' ('Dare to know!').40 Humboldt, 
Schiller, Herder, and eventually Hegel all negotiate with the legacy of the enlightenment, and the 
translation of Bildung into the educational reforms of the early nineteenth century is testament to the 
desire to return to questions posed by enlightenment thinking and to reconfigure them within a new 
state of affairs. Situated at the height of this reform in Berlin, the turn to fifth century Greece to situate 
the classical ideal, as an ideal of antiquity, reshapes the narrative formation of sculpture set out in 
Herder's Plastik. Herder's philosophical lexicon, now housed within the structural organisation of the 
modern University, takes on a different formation. A practical philosophy for the people has no place 
within this context. Warm enthusiasm cannot be implemented into the system, for the system requires 
that the individual alone must react as a motivating force, in the future emergence and development of 
the thinking philosopher. The 'thinking sensorium commune' of our being as a philosophy which 
acknowledges the presence of a plurality of co-existing thinking communities across time and space 
('the sensuous commune of the world'), is replaced by a self-in-abstraction. Bildung becomes a solitary 
aspiration on the part of everyone, to achieve the speculative reconciliation between the particular and 
universal features of the human subject. This ideology paves the way for Hegel's delivery of the 
lectures on fine art at the University of Berlin in 1823, 1826, and 1828-9. Hegel's systematization of the 
fine arts is an example of the transposition of abstractions of sensibility into the space of an abstracting 
head. We know that the outcome of this philosophical pursuit manifests itself in a pure speculative and 
rather chilling abstraction, dissociated from sensibility. The teleological endpoint of Hegel's history of 
art is a disassociation from matter; pure abstraction is the diremption of a mind from a body that thinks. 
As a particular formation of fanaticism, Hegel's philosophical abstraction suits the bureaucratization of 
the University. The administration of Bildung through Humboldt's educational reforms shows us the 
practical implications of disseminating an ideal within the framework of a system. Herder's reception 
within this context is indeed a fight between the head and the heart. 
 
The written language of thought is often difficult and inaccessible. Herder's formation and use of 
sculptural lexemes shows how we can be rigorous and creative with our thinking. Philosophical writing 
should be read in an inventive manner. Herder triggers, provokes and enthuses, because he treats 
philosophy as if it were sculptural, that is, he allows a space to be generated for the reader to imagine 
philosophy as a sculptural practice, and through this process present new ways to read and write with 
the tools of formation. Perhaps this is the complexity and struggle of a philosophical lexicon of the 
sculptural; we have the potential to become a community of sculptors in this cold climate, but as a 
'whole way of life' it will be a 'difficult art of living'. 
 
'A human being who wants to be only head is a monster, as is one who wants to be only 
heart'.41 
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